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Fresh Graduates face
Unemployment
Economic growth is not creating a sufficient number of qualified jobs as
student numbers continue to rise.
Yu Nanping
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Peter Brown
1 The difficulties young Chinese university graduates have had in finding a job over the
past few months have been making the headlines in the media and causing concern
throughout society.  Education professionals in China have all  had something to say
about it. A good number of them, referring to the current phase of social transition in
China,  have  come  out  in  favour  of  the  mass  education  programme  that  has  been
practised in recent years in Chinese universities. Others 1, have raised doubts about the
reliability of the figure of only 70% as the rate of employment for new graduates, which
they  consider  to  be  alarmist.  In  fact,  according  to  the  statistics  provided  by  the
Ministry of Education itself 2, out of the 2.12 million graduates in the general higher
education sector in 2003, 640,000 had not signed a work contract by the end of their
studies 3. 
2 In  these  circumstances,  it  is  understandable  that  in  the  current  labour  market  in
Shanghai, for example, new university graduates are settling for a monthly salary of
1,200 yuan, slightly more than double Shanghai’s minimum wage, at the same time as
they  are  having  to  face significant  overheads  (superannuation,  unemployment
insurance,  health  insurance,  etc.)  4.  If  we  take  into  account  the  cost  of  living  in
Shanghai  (including  accommodation,  transport  and  telecommunications),  it  would
appear that the salary of these graduates is barely enough to cover their basic needs 5.
The purpose of this article is to better understand the current unemployment of young
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graduates, beyond any proposals being put forward in the context of higher education
reform.
Debate and divergent views about the issue 
3 The reform of higher education has brought about the commodification of  Chinese
universities and a policy of mass recruitment of new students. With whole cohorts of
graduating students  entering the job market,  the  unexpected precariousness  of  job
opportunities has given rise to relatively divergent viewpoints within the government’s
ranks and the world of education. Three competing conceptions are discernible. 
4 The first advocates an active search for solutions, by recognising the gravity of the
problem. One commentator in the People’s Daily (Renmin ribao), for example, has stated
that “this is an important matter, and one that affects every sector, as it impinges on
the vital interests of more than two million students, as well as on the development of
the reform of higher education. It  also concerns the strategic measures which have
been  introduced,  aimed  at  maximising  the  country’s  scientific  and  educational
potential and at political stability” 6.  In our view, as we have outlined in a previous
article 7,  “the difficulties that young graduates are encountering are the condensed
manifestation, in the area of employment, of a short-term imbalance between rapid
economic growth and a slower transformation of society. By dint of the nature of this
imbalance,  both  economic  and  social,  economic  and  social  development  must  be
brought into line with each other through a strategy of “putting employment first” if a
solution is to be found to the question of unemployment among new graduates.
5 According to a second viewpoint, while the difficulties of young graduates in finding a
job are real, there should be no going back on the mass student recruitment drive by
universities. In the words of Sun Liping of Qinghua University, “it is pointless denying
that the mass recruitment of students has had the consequence of increasing the rate
of unemployment among young graduates. However, it is solely the structure of the
unemployed population that has been altered by this. By choosing the solution of the
least evil, a democratisation of higher education is occurring, as well as a change in the
structure  of  the  working  population.  Thus  the  difficulties  experienced  by  young
graduates must not be a reason for rejecting the mass recruitment of students” 8. 
6 According to Wen Dongmao, the Vice-President of the Education Institute of Peking
University, “the situation does not augur well for the future. The problem has to be
tackled seriously,  yet  without  overdramatising it”  9.  For  his  part,  Yang Yiyong,  the
Vice-President  of  the  Economic  Research  Institute  at  the  National  Commission  for
Reform and Development, states that “the initial figures on unemployment depend on
quite  a  number  of  factors,  such  that  they  cannot  reflect  the  real  situation  in  its
entirety. Before we can say anything, we have to wait until the end of the year for the
second series of data to be released” 10. 
7 According to a third view, the problem is not as serious as the media suggest. It can be
fixed through the intervention of the market, as proposed by Cai Fang, of the Bureau of
Demographic Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: “graduates have to
accept selection by the marketplace and to have a reasonable view of themselves, so as
to resolve the structural contradictions of employment” 11. For Li Dongmin, in charge of
the Bureau of Sociological Studies in China, “higher education in China has already
entered the process of change, going from an elitist system to a democratic one, which
will only exacerbate the problem for future graduates looking for work. The state has
no need to worry, though. As the notion of employment evolves and the capacity of
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adaptation to the market place is  strengthened,  new graduates will,  in competition
with other workers, show the superiority of their skills” 12. 
8 According to Chen Xian of the University of Shanghai, “if the alarm bells set off by the
unemployment  of  new graduates  have  been amplified  by  the  market,  it  is  because
certain  institutions  have  not  been  opening  up  to  the  job  market.  The  work  force
cannot, therefore, be entirely determined by market forces.” 13 
9 The three conceptions above have not given place to bitter disputes. But just as these
experts  see  diverse  causes  of  the  problem,  so  they  think  of  different  means  for
resolving the unemployment of new graduates. In this context, we need to look for the
reasons that underlie behind the considerable difficulties currently being encountered
by young graduates in their search for employment.
The strategy for developing higher education 
10 In order to analyse the difficult situation of new graduates entering the labour market
today, we have to come back to the reform of higher education in China, which has
taken place over three stages: 
11 1) The first stage was that of “limited development” (1979-91). During this period, the
reform of the economic system had not yet reached its full potential. Education was
completely left out of the reform process, and continued to function according to the
principle of “state centralism”. In terms of national planning, and in accordance with
its requirements, the education system strictly managed all the “inputs” and “outputs”.
Although the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on
the reform of the education system in 1985 brought about the appearance of more than
400  private  tertiary  educational  institutions  (minban or  sili)  14,  by  attacking  the
traditional system of management, the overall strategy of reform in China at the time
had  “the  planned  market  economy”  as  its  underlying  principle.  It  was  under  the
auspices of this principle that the planning of the likely demand for tertiary degrees
and diplomas was implemented, as well as a system of setting the numbers entering the
system in relation to the capacity of the economy to invest. The development strategy
for  higher  education  was  underpinned  by  a  deep  concern  with  the question  of
employment. According to forecasts of the day extrapolating up until 2000, even with
an “exceptional rate of development”, there would be no more than a maximum of four
million tertiary students, making a 5.2% net rate of student participation 15. However,
from that time on, economically and socially advanced provinces, such as Canton, set
up pilot schemes for the mass recruitment of non-scholarship students and those doing
training courses.
12 2)  The  second  stage  was  that  of  “regular  development”  (1992-98).  When  higher
education began its development, its particular feature was the fact that the supply of
diplomas  in  the  tertiary  sector  did  not  match  the  demand  resulting  from  growth.
Higher education developed on the basis of numbers being controlled and limited, and
quality being improved. A report stemming from a study carried out by World Bank
experts from 1993 to 1994 had a very profound effect on the transformation of the
overall strategy for the development of higher education in China. This report clearly
brought  out  the  negative  impact  on  Chinese  economic  growth  of  the  unduly  low
proportion  of  students  in  the  tertiary  sector  16.  Moreover,  at  this  time,  China  had
already entered the international  market by adopting an export-based economy. In
1998,  the Declaration  of  the  World  Conference  on  Higher  Education  organised  by
UNESCO in Paris  made the Chinese government aware that  a  rapid increase  in  the
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enrolment  figures  in  higher  education would  be  a  way to  respond to  the  needs  of
opening up and the requirements of economic and social development.
13 3) Beginning in 1999, the education system underwent an “accelerated development”. A
real strategic turning point came at that time, when the higher education sector saw its
figures increase in a startling fashion. Not only did student numbers in universities go
from 5.04 million in 1998 to 5.94 million in 1999, but tertiary institutions in general
increased  their  intake  by  47.4%.  Over  the  same  period,  experts  from  the  world  of
education produced a copious literature in which they affirmed that “China can begin
the attack on the massification of its higher education sector, as it now has a special
feature, that of the plurality of the tertiary system, described by Martin Trow in his
theory of massification” 17.
14 Many  researchers  on  education,  however,  failed  to  take  into  account  either  the
unprecedented deflation that the Chinese economy was to experience after the terrible
floods of 1998, or the slowing down of growth that fell to 7.1%, as a consequence of
which experts  submitted proposals  to  state organs to stimulate economic recovery.
This  involved  increasing  student  numbers  and  intensifying  the  commodification  of
education  as  a  way  of  stimulating  internal  consumption.  While  the  deflation,  both
national and international, of the past few years has not been stemmed in any real way,
higher  education  has  seen  its  numbers  constantly  grow,  under  the  impact  of  the
strategy of widening the internal demand. Student numbers climbed from 7.23 million
in 2000 to 9.31 million in 2001 and 11.46 million in 2002 18.
15 The development of higher education in China throughout these three stages has been
characterised, on the one hand, by the move from a “pure planning model” to a “pure
market” one—the tertiary education sector having undergone a gradual change in its
direction, doctrine and organisation—and, on the other, by a rapid increase in numbers
(20% a year on average). It was not until 2003 that the capacity of the labour market to
accommodate all these new recruits from higher education could be tested for the first
time. 
The peculiarities and contradictions of the labour market
16 In  order  to  analyse  the  unemployment  of  young  graduates,  it  is  important  to
understand the present state of employment in China. A 1995 study showed that the
Chinese workforce available, 755 million people, that is 26.3% of the world total, was
equivalent to 1.64 times the 432 million workers there are in high income countries.
However, the total sum of Chinese capital investments represents only 3.4% of the total
world volume. This means that China uses 3.4% of capital resources to provide more
than a quarter of the world’s jobs 19. As China will not enter the phase of zero labour
growth until 2020, the impossibility of full employment shows itself to be an inevitable
consequence of changing to a market economy and is also intricately bound up with
maintaining low labour costs in the country over the long term. 
17 Secondly,  the  transition  from  a  planned  to  a  market  economy,  as  well  as  the
restructuring  of  particular  sectors  and  the  redefining  of  rights  of  ownership,  are
accompanied  by  the  long-term  structural unemployment  of  workers  in  state-run
enterprises.  Between 1995  and 2001,  employment  was  reduced by  32.2% across  the
whole of this latter sector (36.21 million jobs lost).  For the collective work units of
townships and cantons, the drop was 59%, which means 18.56 million fewer positions.
Overall, there were 54.77 million fewer jobs―double the volume of the entire French
workforce 20. This trend has been further marked these past few years and, although
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new national and foreign investment has taken up a part of the workforce, the number
of jobs created is far from meeting the needs of the urban workforce. In 2003, eight
million new jobs were created, while the working population grew from 20 to 22 million
people. The shortfall is greater still if we take into account the migrant population,
over 15 million of whom enter the urban job market each year 21.
18 Thirdly, the nature of available jobs is changing. Manual labour is dying out with the
change of economic model and technological adjustment. From 1978 to 1996, the value
added created by Chinese industry multiplied by a factor of 6.6, which was an annual
growth rate approaching 12%. The economy went from a situation of penury to one of
chronic surplus, while at the same time as the profit levels in the industrial sector fell
rapidly (in the non-monopoly sectors they were below bank interest rates for the same
period).  This  created  a  significant  excess  in  production  capacity,  with  a  rate  of
equipment  use  below  40%  22 in  many  spheres  of  activity.  Furthermore,  the  world
technological  revolution,  bringing  about  the  structural  transformation  of  Chinese
industry, saw the export rate of manufactured goods rise from 72% in 1990 to 88% in
2000, while the export rate for hi-tech goods reached 19% 23. 
 
Job offers and economic prosperity: no correlation 
Sources: Zhongguo qingnian bao, August 21 2003 and China National Bureau of Statistics
19 It also needs to be said that the distribution of the benefits of Chinese economic growth
is increasingly uneven. The Gini ratio has gone from 0.35 in 1988 to about 0.458 today,
when the richest 20% of the population own 48.5% of all resources 24. The wealth being
created is  not  going to  the  majority  of  the  population,  which puts  a  break on the
growth of the service sector. Another consequence is that a large part of the workforce
has no possibility of moving into the new production sectors, creating a clogging effect
in the labour market.  In Shanghai,  China’s  most dynamic city,  the service sector is
growing on average by two points a year, considerably below the pace of economic
growth  overall.  The  employment  of  new  graduates  depends  at  the  present  time,
therefore, on the choices being made in terms of employment, which are constrained
by historical conditions, and a particular market structure and growth model. 
The particular causes of unemployment among new Chinese graduates
20 There is a distinct lack of correlation between the rate of job offers to new graduates
and NDP growth (see Graph 1). In 1999, economic growth was a low 7.1%, while the rate
of job offers to new graduates, at 79.3%, exceeded the 1998 figure of 76.8%, for a growth
of  7.8% (to  simplify  things,  we  conflate  the  employment  rate  and  the  rate  of  new
graduates  under  pre-contract).  The  employment  rate  for  new  graduates  has  most
certainly not followed the increase in growth. If the rate of young graduates under a
pre-contract in 1998, about 76%, created no panic at all, why then did the 76% in 2003
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cause so much commotion among the general public and researchers alike? How can
this difference be explained? 
21 First of all, we should point out the problematic discrepancy between employment and
the strong growth of the Chinese economy that was sustained for nearly five years at a
regular average rate of 7.7%. As the harmful effects of SARS were overcome in the first
half of 2003, the NDP grew by 8.2%. However, this remarkable economic growth rate did
not  bring  about  any  effective  increase  in  employment  in  the  major  Chinese  cities.
Shanghai, for example, experienced an unemployment rate of 4.8% and had 277,800
registered unemployed in April 2003 25. As to Peking, the most recent figures are 5.9%
and 361,000 respectively 26. In both these cities, unemployment exceeds the 4% mark set
by the state at the beginning of 2003. According to other studies carried out in Chinese
cities, the unemployment rate throughout the past few years has steadily been above
8% 27, and shows no sign of abating. 
22 It is rather in the structure of Chinese economic growth that we must look for relevant
explanations.  It  would  appear  that,  in  spite  of  an  annual  growth  rate  of  30%  for
investment in fixed capital and exports that has effectively carried the NDP along with
it, the annual growth in household consumption has struggled to stay around the 10%
mark.  Not  only  does  the  Chinese  growth show a  structural  imbalance  (particularly
marked by a dramatic take-off in real estate prices that went up in Shanghai by 18.1%
in the first half of 2003 28), but the development of the service sector has slowed as a
result,  at the  same time  as  studies  show that  the  employment-growth  elasticity  is
higher in the service sector (0.57) than in the manufacturing sector (0.34) 29. In Peking,
this ratio underwent a significant drop, with a value of 0.15 during the Eight Five-Year
Plan and of 0.09 during the Ninth Five-Year Plan 30. 
23 In the past, an increase of one point in the NDP would create two million new jobs.
Today, it creates only 800,000, with an elasticity somewhere between 0.1 and 0.12 31.
Consequently, while investments in fixed capital, real estate, foreign trade and certain
industrial sectors such as the automobile industry and metallurgy are becoming the
power engines of the economy, jobs in these sectors are not being created at the same
pace. 
24 The employment  situation  in  China  is  very  tight  overall,  with  nearly  eight  million
unemployed being registered in the cities and townships in the first half of 2003, and an
official unemployment rate of 4.2% 32. The rate of recent graduates under pre-contract
in 2003 was comparable to that of 1998 and 1999, but in those years students still had a
choice of job, whereas at the present time, even with fewer demands, finding a suitable
position  is  a  relatively  arduous  task.  The  unemployment  of  which  recent  Chinese
graduates  are  the  victims  has  nothing  to  do  with  traditional  structural,  frictional
unemployment or that linked to the economic climate of the day. Rather, it is related to
particular features of Chinese growth, which is not creating enough skilled jobs. 
25 We will now examine the social fallout that is the result of an imbalance in growth
leading to a concentration of jobs in particular sectors. The commodification of higher
education has transformed the pattern of job allocation for young graduates, which has
now  become  a  function  of  the  needs  of  the  labour  market. The  reform of  higher
education  tuition  fees,  begun  in  1999,  has  led  students  embarking  on  four-year
programmes to lay out anything from 50,000 to 80,000 yuan. The fees for a student at a
standard university represent 62% of  the average Chinese household budget 33.  The
commodification  of  education  assumes,  however,  that  this  investment  will  be
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recovered, that is to say that once they graduate these young people will find a well-
paid job. The difference of more than 40% between incomes in the east and the west of
China  is  forcing  them to  seek  employment  in  the  cities  in  the south-east.  Today’s
students  are  fully  engrossed  in  obtaining  their  degrees  and  diplomas,  unlike  their
predecessors  of  the 1980s who showed more interest  in  society and the state.  This
means that merely preaching to them will not see them take off to far-flung parts of
the country to set up a business, as did their parents’ generation who graduated in the
1950s.  Individual  investment  in  higher  education  and  a  proper  return  on  such
investment must be proportionate to each other. 
26 However, as long as new graduates are obliged to go and seek work in the big coastal
cities  of  the  south-east,  so  as  to  balance  investment  in  education  and  real  social
success―for which their parents deprived themselves―and as long as the social and
economic  realities  constrain  students’  choices,  the  gap  between the  haves  and  the
have-nots will only grow wider and the imbalance in development between the west
and the east will contribute to the geographical concentration of jobs for new Chinese
graduates. The per capita NDP in the developed zones of the east is today double that of
the western provinces, and nearly 60% of NDP comes from the eastern provinces 34. The
concentration in the east of attractive jobs for young graduates will, over time, come to
be a harmful factor, further widening the gulf between east and west. It runs the risk of
producing growing regional antagonisms, bringing about the loss of any possibility of
social betterment for workers in the west, and undermining the west’s development
strategy that the government is supporting with large amounts of public money. 
27 The structural  weaknesses  of  economic  growth,  allied to  the  extreme imbalance  in
development between regions, explain the emergence of the growing visibility of new
graduate  unemployment.  An understanding of  this  problem is  the  precondition for
adopting any workable employment policy. 
The social pressure of graduate unemployment
28 We have to ask ourselves whether this unemployment of new graduates is a specifically
Chinese phenomenon. Admittedly, the question of unemployment presents different
characteristics in each country, related to the particular social and economic system in
place. Nor does there exist any standard tool for measuring the seriousness of a social
problem.  Nonetheless,  studies  do  show  that  different  social  problems  emerge,
depending  on  the  age  group affected  by  unemployment.  Long-term unemployment
concerning  young  people  lowers  the  sense  they  have  of  social  responsibilities  and
reduces the quality of human resources, not only of the present but also of the future
workforce 35.  Consequently,  the employment situation among young people and the
pleasure  they  derive  from  their  work  show  themselves  to  be  useful  indicators  for
assessing a society’s future. Young people contribute to forging the future value system
and outlook of a society. These factors also contribute in intangible ways to changing a
country’s national identity. 
29 As far as present-day Chinese students are concerned, public opinion may well carry on
constantly  criticising  their  inability  to  improve  their  efficiency,  their  absence  of
idealism, their lack of a sense of social cohesion and social responsibilities… Yet, the
fact  remains  that  objectively  speaking  the  reform  and  commodification  of higher
education have led families to invest important sums of money in the education of their
children (the fees for a good university in the east of China amount to 10,000 yuan a
year, which is equivalent to a whole year’s income in a city in the west of the country).
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Students are also subject to incredible psychological pressure. With 30% of their ranks
today unemployed, new graduates may well take a long, hard look at their personal
qualities or before choosing their area of specialisation. 
30 The annual growth in the numbers of new graduates, estimated at four million for 2005,
and in the rate of young unemployed graduates (with 8% annual growth, the Chinese
NDP  may  well  generate  about  eight  million  jobs,  but  these  are  mainly  ones  in
manufacturing 36 requiring low-level qualifications), should logically bring about either
a withdrawal from higher education or deviant individual behaviour patterns 37. This
pressure on employment could lead to a destabilisation of society 38. We can suppose
that the students’ feeling of social failure may go as far as to find expression in violent
protests  that  could  be  taken  further  by  other,  less  educated,  sections  of  society.
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the social structure of today’s China has
nothing to do with that of 1989. If there was student agitation back then, it was because
different  social  factions?  /groups?,  seeing  their  situation  becoming  increasingly
precarious,  had  joined  forces  to  shake  the  power  of  the  authorities,  resulting  in
unforeseeable consequences. 
Solutions for resolving the problem 
31 Several solutions are being considered to resolve the problem of the unemployment of
young graduates. Some call for a policy of non-intervention based on the natural effects
of economic growth. According to Cai Fang, in charge of the Bureau of Demographic
Studies  in  the  Chinese  Academy  of  Sciences,  “the  government  should  gradually
abandon policies aimed specifically at promoting the employment of new graduates,
and encourage them to  create  their  own enterprise  and accept  the  realities  of  the
situation” 39. Chen Xian, a professor at the University of Shanghai, feels that talk about
difficulties in finding work for young graduates is exaggerated: “these difficulties are
due to the fact that the volume of available jobs in institutions such as those of higher
education,  government bodies or organs of  scientific  research has,  like recruitment
methods,  slowed  down the  process  of  commodifying  the  workforce.  (…).  As  to  the
symptoms affecting the job market, in other words the difficulties in finding a job for
new  graduates,  they  have  been  exaggerated.  What  is  needed,  therefore,  is  a
thoroughgoing reform of these institutions” 40. 
32 First, let us consider the proposal for enterprise creation. At the height of the “net-
economy” in 2000, “the creation of enterprises by young graduates” was the concept
most in vogue with public opinion and on the campuses.  However,  as the economy
weakened  and  fewer  investment  risks  were  taken,  hardly  any  cases  of  successful
enterprise creation could be found among those that new graduates had begun to set
up (the successful cases were in large part the result of graduates coming back to China
after studying abroad). When we know that in China today a large proportion of private
capital cruelly lacks opportunities for investment, it could well be that the supposed
enterprise creations by young graduates are the wild imaginings of scholars, and will
remain  in  official  discourse  for  a  certain  time  only.  In  reality,  there  is  very  little
creation of enterprises by young graduates today and, for want of capital, the trend is
clearly towards the creation of small individual businesses (newspaper stands, small
bookshops, record shops). 
33 Let us now turn to look at the second proposal, namely the commodification of the
workforce within public institutions. Even without considering the measures taken in
recent years to rejuvenate and improve the training of the Party’s cadres and those in
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executive positions in public bodies in the large cities, the level of studies attained is
already higher overall than that of a four-year university programme, in accordance
with  requirements  regarding  the  status  of  functionaries/civil  servants/government
workers?. In plain language, thanks to later-year courses 41, many functionaries/civil
servants/government workers? in positions of responsibility have, over the past few
years,  obtained  qualifications  that  make  them  more  attractive  than  those  with
university degrees. While the de facto retirement age in firms has been brought forward
to  57  for  men  and  50  for  women,  if  we  suppose  that  the  40  to  50  year-olds  who
currently  have  jobs  and who  are  competent  workers  with  a  long  professional
experience, might also be retrenched to make way for new graduates, it would then be
these young retirees who would exert pressure on employment and society alike. Even
without thinking about its financial cost, where would such an employment policy by
“cyclical substitution” lead if it brought forward the retirement age―to 40 years of age,
or even earlier? 
34 It appears plainly to us that encouraging new graduates to set up enterprises is aimed
at hedging the problem of unemployment. If it were so easy to set up an enterprise,
then the Chinese banks would not be holding thousands of billions of yuan in deposits,
without those with the savings being able to benefit from even a 1% return. The use of
substitution labour in public institutions can itself play only a palliative role of support,
without being the solution to the problem. 
35 As long as it is impossible to establish a balance between “supply” and “demand”, and
while  market  mechanisms are  inadequate,  the  first  thing to  do  is  to  recognise  the
singularity and the gravity of the problem. Next, the objectives specific to economic
development need to  be brought into line with those of  social  progress,  under the
banner  of  the  strategic  choice  of  an  “employment  first”  approach.  Such  a  choice
implies an important rejigging of objectives, but also a revision of what is understood
by economic growth. For their part, local governments have to go through a radical
transformation  and  stop  pursuing  objectives  that  are  defined  solely  in  terms  of
competitiveness and entrepreneurship.  If  job creation and resolving the problem of
unemployment become the fundamental long-term objectives, unemployment benefit
schemes  and  casual  unemployment  relief  schemes  must  be  set  up  that  specifically
target  students  (based  on  the  minimum  salary  in  Shanghai,  seven  billion  yuan  in
unemployment  benefits  will  have  to  be  spent  each  year  for  the  million  new
unemployed graduates produced nationally).
36 Sociological studies show that the threat of unemployment hanging over society does
not only consist  in deviant individual behaviour patterns.  By undermining the self-
esteem of individuals and the community as a whole, it also serves to encourage the
appearance of anti-social movements. Conceptual approaches to the question in China
remain clearly superficial.  A good many commentators fail  to take into account the
means of subsistence of new graduates, yet moral lessons are being handed out to them
in abundance. The discourse on the creation of enterprises by young graduates is no
more  than  logorrhoea,  although  by  the  same  token  we  should  be  careful  not  to
trivialise this problem that can potentially produce social conflict. A country’s future is
its youth, which is the most qualified section of its population. If our society demands
of  today’s  new graduates  that  they  marshal  their  forces  to  create  the  future,  it  is
incumbent upon the government for its part to guarantee them the “right to work” or
the basic one of being able to be “in line for a job”, in the absence of which it is highly
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likely that, following Hemingway’s “lost generation” and Ginsberg’s “beat generation”,
the young Chinese graduates will become a “ruined generation”. In this respect, we
should bear in mind the warning given by Friedrich Hayek: “(…) there exists another
serious problem. The number of intellectuals has already exceeded what we are capable
of employing gainfully. For the sake of political stability, there is almost nothing that is
as dangerous as an ‘intellectual proletarian’ without future prospects” 42.
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